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District Court of Queensland Act 1967 s 68 – jurisdiction in pre-proceedings 
applications under Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 – material required 
to attract jurisdiction 
 
In Woolworths Ltd v Graham [2007] QDC 301 Searles DCJ struck out a pre-
proceedings application under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“the 
PIPA”) on the basis that the material before the Court was not sufficient to attract the  
jurisdiction of the District Court. 
 
Facts 
 
The applicant brought an originating application for various orders under the PIPA, 
including an order under sections 9(3A) and 35 that the respondent deliver the Part 2 
Notice of Claim within 14 days of the order of the court. The applicant also sought an 
order that the respondent pay the applicant’s standard costs of and incidental to the 
application on the standard basis. 
 
At the hearing the applicant’s solicitor advised that the applicant would not be 
proceeding in respect of the substantive relief because the respondent had complied 
with the terms of the orders sought. This meant the only issue before the court was the 
question of costs. 
 
It was submitted for the respondent that the costs of the application should be paid by 
the respondent, and that they should be paid on the indemnity basis because: 
(a) the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the application; and 
(b) if the court did have jurisdiction, the application had nevertheless been 
brought in the wrong District. 
 
It was necessary for the court to examine the jurisdiction issue in order to determine 
the appropriate costs order. 
 
Legislation 
 
Section 68(1)(a) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (“the Act”) provides 
that the District Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine: 
“all personal actions, where the amount value or damage sought to be 
recovered does not exceed the monetary limit…” 
 
Under section 68(2) of the Act “monetary limit” means $250,000. 
 
The definition in the schedule (dictionary) of the PIPA of “court” provides relevantly: 
“court in relation to a claim means: 
(a) … 
(b) If no proceeding based on the claim has been started – a court with 
jurisdiction to hear the claim.” 
 
 
Did the court have jurisdiction? 
 
It was argued for the respondent that the applicant had not put before the court any 
material to evidence the claim fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the District 
Court. 
 
Searles DCJ referred at some length to the unanimous decision of the then Full Court 
on the issue of jurisdiction in Startune Pty Ltd v Ultra-Tune Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd 
(1991) 1 Qd R 192 and also to the decision of the Full Court in Matelot Holdings Pty 
Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (1993) 2 Qd R 168. In each case the Court had 
concluded that the actions were outside the jurisdiction of the District Court, which 
had no power to grant the relief sought. Searles DCJ said (at 6): 
 
These cases establish that to attract the jurisdiction of the District Court, it is 
necessary that the cause of action is one invested in the court to hear and 
determine. Section 68 of the Act particularises the civil jurisdiction of the 
court. The potential cause of action in the present situation is one under 
s68(1)(a) which invests the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine 
personal actions not exceeding the monetary limit of $250,000 specified in 
s68(2). Accordingly, for the court to have jurisdiction to entertain the 
applicant’s substantive application, it is necessary for the applicant to establish 
to establish that the court had jurisdiction within s68(1)(a). 
 
Since there was nothing in the applicant’s material addressing this issue, the judge 
found the applicant failed the threshold requirement, and therefore the court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the application.  
 
In the light of this finding, he said it was unnecessary to consider the second of the 
respondent’s grounds of argument about the appropriate district for the filing of the 
application. 
 
Material required to establish jurisdiction 
 
Searles DCJ then considered what material would normally be sufficient to attract the 
court’s jurisdiction on an application which is, by its nature, one of a type to be made 
before any action is commenced. 
 
In this regard he said that if the applicant’s injuries have stabilised, it would be 
sufficient for the applicant’s solicitor to depose to the relevant facts then available to 
establish that the damages the applicant might expect to recover would bring the 
future action within the jurisdictional limit of the District Court.  
 
If an applicant’s injuries have not stabilised, his Honour suggested the best an 
applicant could do was to depose, personally or by solicitor that, on the facts then 
known, it is likely that the entitlement to damages would be within the jurisdiction of 
the District Court and that the applicant’s present intention was to commence 
proceedings in that court when appropriate.  
 
The judge emphasised that any opinion as to prospective damages should be properly 
factually supported by affidavit evidence rather than merely the expression of an 
opinion by an applicant’s solicitor on the issue. He referred in this respect to two 
decisions mentioned by the Court of Appeal in Merrin v Cairns Port Authority [2006] 
QCA 278, namely Lovell (Supreme Court of Queensland, No 587 of 1983, Master 
Lee, 5.8.83, unreported) and Doo v Murphy (Supreme Court of Queensland, No 995 
of 1992, 22.12.92, unreported). His Honour acknowledged, however, that ultimately it 
was the opinion of the court, rather than that of the applicant’s legal advisor, which 
determined the issue of jurisdiction. 
 
Searles DCJ acknowledged that it may be later found that the damages suffered by the 
applicant were likely to attract an award in excess of the District Court jurisdiction, 
but noted that the Act contemplated that contingency. He referred in this respect to 
sections 83 (Transfer of certain actions from District Court to Supreme Court at 
defendant’s instance, 73 (Splitting demands – abandonment of excess) and 85 
(Procedure if proceeding started in wrong court). 
 
Orders 
 
Searles J DCJ then considered the order he should make under s 85 of the Act 
(Procedure if proceedings started in wrong court) and concluded the appropriate order 
was to strike out the application under s 85(5)(a) for want of jurisdiction.  
 
As the applicant had been forced to bring the application, though an ill-fated one,  
because of the respondent’s failure to comply with her obligations under the PIPA, the 
judge concluded the appropriate exercise of his discretion under s 85(5)(b) in relation 
to costs was that there be no order as to costs. 
 
Comment 
 
The circumstances facing the applicant in this case are not uncommon. The Personal 
Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) prohibits a claimant from commencing 
proceedings until some particular pre-proceedings steps have been taken. There are a 
range of provisions which contemplate applications to the court “with jurisdiction to 
hear the claim” before any proceedings are commenced.  
 
The same is true of claims to which the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (see 
esp the definition of “court” in s 4 of that Act) or the Workers’ Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (see esp the definition of “court” in schedule 6) apply. 
 
The views of Searles DCJ in this case are helpful practical advice about the material 
that will normally be sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of the District Court, 
particularly on those occasions where it is necessary to bring an application before a 
claimant’s injuries have stablilised so as to allow realistic quantification of the 
claimant’s likely damages entitlement.  
 
The decision serves more broadly as a reminder that the District Court is an inferior 
court of defined and limited jurisdiction and that any proceedings brought in it must 
be demonstrably within the jurisdiction conferred on that court by legislation. 
 
 
